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ARTICLE
THE SAC PROPOSAL FOR THE MONETIZATION OF THE FILE SHARING
OF MUSIC IN CANADA: DOES IT COMPLY WITH CANADA'S
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO COPYRIGHT?
Barry Sookman*

In November 2007, the Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC) released a
proposal for the monetization of the file sharing of music in Canada. This
article attempts to determine whether or not Canada, given its international
and bilateral treaty agreements, could ever adopt the SAC‘s proposal. The
article approaches this analysis through the ―three-step test‖, which was
adopted under the Berne Convention in 1971 and enshrined in the
subsequent TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA; the article also analyzes whether
or not the Proposal is compatible with Canada‘s obligations under the Rome
Convention. The article concludes that, without amendments to the
international treaties to copyright of which Canada is a part, a proposal like
SAC‘s could not be successfully enacted.
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I
INTRODUCTION
On 16 November 2007 the Songwriters Association of Canada
(―SAC‖) issued a press release1 announcing a Proposal for the
Monetization of the File Sharing of Music (the ―Proposal‖).2 The main
aspects of the Proposal are the following:
The Copyright Act (the ―Act‖) would be amended to
establish a new right: ―The Right to Equitable
Remuneration for Music File Sharing‖. The term
―Music File Sharing‖ is defined in the Proposal ―as the
sharing of a copy of a copyrighted musical work
without motive of financial gain‖.
The amendments to the Act would create exceptions
or limitations (the ―proposed file sharing exception‖)
which ―would make it legal to share music between
two or more parties, whether over Peer-to-Peer
networks, wireless networks, email, CD, DVD, hard

―Music file sharing proposal‖ (news release), Songwriters Association of Canada (16
November 2007), online: Songwriters Association of Canada
<http://www.songwriters.ca/NWS10.php?news_id=24>.
2 ―A Proposal for the Monetization of the File Sharing of Music From the Songwriters
and Recording Artists of Canada‖ Songwriters Association of Canada, online:
Songwriters Association of Canada <http://www.songwriters.ca/studio/proposal.php>.
1
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drives, etc.‖ This ―new right would authorize the
sharing of music with other individuals‖.
The proposed file sharing exception would apply ―to
the majority of the world‘s repertoire of music‖.
The proposed file sharing exception would not apply
to ―parties who receive compensation for file sharing‖.
Therefore, commercial entities such as iTunes and
PureTracks would not benefit from the exception.
Music sites like iTunes and PureTracks would
continue to be licensed directly by creators and rights
holders ―and would continue to develop attractive
‗value added‘ services and security features that keep
them distinct from the file sharing activities‖.
Creators and rights holders would receive equitable
remuneration in the amount of $5.00 per Internet
subscription.
The Proposal states that ―the amount of income
generated annually could adequately compensate the
industry for years of declining sales and lost revenues,
and would dramatically enhance current legal digital
music income. Sales of physical product would
continue to earn substantial amounts, albeit gradually
decreasing.‖
SAC stated that it sees ―this model being adopted
internationally‖ and is ―working with Creators‘ groups around the
world to effect a global system of remuneration for the sharing of
music files‖. The Proposal attracted considerable debate and public
comment. This article examines part of the debate: whether the
Proposal could ever be implemented without violating Canada‘s
international and bilateral treaties related to copyright. As explained
below, the Proposal would violate the three-step test enshrined in the
Berne Convention,3 the TRIPS Agreement,4 and NAFTA.5 It would

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works , Sept. 9, 1886;
revised July 24, 1971 and amended 1979, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715.
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197 [TRIPS].
3
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also breach Canada‘s obligations under the Rome Convention.6
Accordingly, the Proposal, like other proposals to establish
―alternative compensation systems‖, ―non-commercial use levies‖, and
―non-voluntary licenses‖ to authorize non-commercial P2P file
sharing of music7, could not be implemented in the manner proposed
without abrogating international agreements related to copyright8.
II
CANADA‘S APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Proposals for exceptions to copyright are evaluated for
conformance with Canada‘s international obligations related to
copyright.9 For example, exceptions to create levies for private
copying, which create substantially narrower exceptions to exclusive
rights than the Proposal, are structured to ensure they do not abrogate
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992,
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].
6 Rome Convention: International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 26 October 1961, 496
U.N.T.S. 44 [Rome Convention].
5

See N. W. Netanel, ―Impose a Non-Commercial Use Levy to All Free Peer-to-peer
File Sharing‖, Harvard J. of Law & Technology (2003) at19 [―Netanel‖]; W. W.
Fischer, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment ,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) at 199-251 [―Fischer‖]; L. Lessig, The
Future of Ideas, (New York: Random House, 2001) at 254 seq. [―Lessig‖]; Raymond
Ku, ―The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of
Digital Technology‖ (2002) 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 263 [―Ku‖]; Peter Eckersley, ―Virtual
Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?‖ (2004) 18
Harvard J. L. & Tech. 85 [―Eckersley‖]; Jessica Litman, ―Sharing and Stealing‖ (2004)
24 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. [―Litman‖].
8 See Bob Rietjens, ―Copyright and the Three-Step Test: Are Broadband Levies Too
Good to be True?‖ (2006) 20 (3) Int‘l. Rev. L. & Computers 323 [―Rietjens‖]; Alexander
Peukert, ―A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment‖, (2005)
28:1 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. [―Peukert‖]. It has also been suggested that the
federal government would not have the constitutional authority to enact a broad
based levy on ISPs to provide compensation for unauthorised file sharing. See Jeremy
F. de Beer, ―The Role of Levies in Canada‘s Digital Music Market Place‖, (2005) 4:3
Cdn. J. L. & Tech. 153.
9 Wanda Noel et al ―Free v. Fee‖, (2006) 23 C.I.P.R. 1; See also Taking Forward the
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Proposed Changes to Copyright Exceptions ,
U.K. Intellectual Property Office, at paras. 31-32 [Noel].
7
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international obligations related to copyright.10 A proposal that
would permit file sharing of music would be subject to this scrutiny
by the Canadian Government. Such scrutiny is hardly unusual: the
German Ministry of Justice, for instance, declined to adopt a new
exception to copyright with respect to non-commercial file sharing,
expressly referring to the three-step test under the Berne
Convention.11
Whether the Proposal would comply with Canada‘s
obligations under the Berne Convention, NAFTA, the TRIPS
Agreement and the Rome Convention is therefore of more than
academic interest. Canada has ratified the Berne Convention, Rome
Convention and TRIPS and is a party to NAFTA. There are 163
contracting parties to the Berne Convention, 86 contracting parties to
the Rome Convention and 151 WTO Members have acceded to the
TRIPS Agreement. Canada‘s most significant trading partner, the
United States, along with Mexico, are parties with Canada to NAFTA.
Canada cannot easily resile from or change these agreements.
Further, both the TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA contain dispute
resolution mechanisms which can result in sanctions for the violation
of these treaties.12
Under the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and
NAFTA, Canada must provide copyright holders with the exclusive
Ricketson et al, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, 2d ed.
(2006) [―Ricketson‖], paras. 10.31-10.34; Mihály Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and
the Internet (2002) [―Ficsor‖], §3.16; Opinion of the Council of Copyright Experts,
No. SzJSzT 17/06 of May 11, 2006 (Hungary) at paras. 8-10 [―Hungarian Opinion‖];
Remuneration of Private Copying in Australia at 570-71, 582 [―Aust. Report‖]
11 Peukert, supra note 8 at 51.
12 The WTO dispute resolution process has been used to address alleged failures of
countries to honour their treaty obligations related to copyright. See United States –
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTO Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R, 15
June 2000 [the ―WTO Decision‖]. Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March, 2000 [―WTO Patent Decision‖]. Also, on
September 25, 2007, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to review
China‘s Protection and Enforcement Measures of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/7. Disputes under the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention can
be referred to the International Court of Justice by a party to a dispute. Berne
Convention, supra note 3 at Article 33; Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 30.
Further, since members of TRIPs and NAFTA must comply with the applicable
provisions of the Berne Convention, a breach of that convention by Canada could also
subject Canada to sanctions under TRIPs and NAFTA.
10
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right to make and to authorize reproductions of musical works.13
Producers of sound recording must be given the exclusive right to
make and to authorize reproductions of sound recordings pursuant to
the Rome Convention, NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement.14 Because
sound recordings of popular songs intrinsically contain a musical
work, Canada must comply with each of these international treaties,
conventions and agreements with respect to both sound recordings
and musical works. Further, Canada must provide copyright holders
with the exclusive right to authorize the communication of musical
works and performances of musical works to the public.15 Both the
reproduction right and the right to communicate works to the public
are relied upon by rights holders to commercially exploit music in
Canada, including over digital networks like the Internet.16
Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 9(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4 at
Part II Article 9.1 (requires compliance with the Berne Convention); NAFTA, supra
note 5 at Article 1701 (requires compliance with the Berne Convention).
14 Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 10; NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article
1706(1) (requires the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction
of sound recordings); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4 at Part II Article 14.2 (requires
the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of sound
recordings). See also, Article 10 Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms [―Phonograms
Convention‖] (1971) (each Contracting State must protect producers of phonograms
against the making of duplicates and against the importation of such duplicates for the
purpose of distribution to the public and against the distribution of duplicates to the
public).
15 Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 11; NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article
1705(c) (requires authors to have the right to authorize or prohibit the
communication of works to the public); TRIPS, supra note 4 at Article 9.1 (requires
compliance with the Berne Convention).
16 Unauthorized copying of musical works and sound recordings can infringe the
reproduction right in ss.3(1) and 18(1) of the Act. Copies are made each time a
musical work or sound recording is uploaded or downloaded. Sookman: Computer,
Internet and Electronic-Commerce Law (Thomson Carswell) at s. 3.7(a). The
reproduction right is implicated when a work or sound recording is copied onto
servers for the purposes of offering a streaming or download service. Statement of
Royalties to be Collected by CMRRA/SODRAC Inc. for the reproduction of musical
works in Canada by Ontario Music Services in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Copyright Board,
March 16, 2007 [―CSI Online Decision‖]. The rights to authorize communications to
the public and to communicate works to the public are also implicated in the posting
of a musical work on a website for the purpose of transmission to the public and the
transmission of performances and downloads to the public. Society of Composers,
13

Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet
Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427; Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association
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III
THE PROPOSAL‘S INCOMPATIBILITY WITH CANADA‘S THREE-STEP
OBLIGATIONS
Under the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and
NAFTA, Canada agreed to confine limitations or exceptions to the
reproduction right for musical works to circumstances in which all
three of following conditions (known as the ―three-step test‖) are met:
(1) the limitation or exception is limited to ―certain special cases‖, (2)
―the reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation‖ of the
work, and (3) the limitation or exception ―does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author‖.17 Under NAFTA,
Canada agreed to the same three-step test for exceptions or limitations
to the exclusive reproduction right associated with sound recordings.18
The three-step test has its origins in the Berne Convention
(1971). Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention states the following:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries in the
Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.

Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement is modelled after Article
9(2) of the Berne Convention. It states the following:
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.

Apart from the difference in the use of the terms ―permit‖ and
―confine‖ and ―author‖ and ―right holder‖, the main difference
between Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13 of the
v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada 2008 FCA 6; Tariff
No. 22.A (Internet Online Music Services) 1996-2006, Copyright Board, October 18,
2007.

Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 9(2); TRIPS supra note 4 at Part II,
Article 13; NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1705(5); Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras.
13.11-13.25.
18 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1706(3).
17
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TRIPS Agreement is that the former applies only to the reproduction
right. The wording of Article 13 does not contain this limitation and
applies to all copyright rights in works to be provided by the Berne
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.19 Accordingly, it applies to
both the reproduction and communication to the public rights.

NAFTA goes further than either the Berne Convention or the
TRIPS Agreement. Under NAFTA the three-step test applies to
limitations or exceptions related to sound recordings as well as to
works protected by copyright such as musical works.20
Each of the three conditions of the three-step test is given a
distinct meaning to avoid a reading that could reduce any of the
conditions to redundancy or inutility.21 Further, the three conditions
apply on a cumulative basis. Each is a separate and independent
requirement that must be satisfied before an exception or limitation
will comply with the three-step test. The failure to comply with any
one of the three conditions results in the exception or limitation being
disallowed. For example, an exception that is a special case may
nonetheless conflict with the normal exploitation step and an
exception that does not unreasonably conflict with the normal
exploitation condition could nonetheless unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.22
The Proposal does not meet any of the three conditions of the
three-step test. It therefore fails to comply with Canada‘s treaty
obligations on three separate grounds. An analysis of the three-step
test in relation to the Proposal is set out below.

WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.71-6.74.
NAFTA, supra note 5 at Articles 1705.5, 1706.3.
21 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.97; WTO Patent Decision, supra note 12 at
para. 7.21.
22 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.97; WTO Patent Decision, supra note 12 at
para. 7; Ficsor, supra note 10 at 91-92; WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.74; M.
Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test (2004) [―Senftleben‖] at
para. 4.3.; Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras. 13.11-13.25.
19
20
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IV
FIRST STEP: THE PROPOSAL IS NOT A ―CERTAIN SPECIAL CASE‖
The first step, the ―certain special case‖ limitation condition,
imposes at least two, and according to some authorities three
requirements. Limitations or exceptions are a ―certain special case‖
only if they are (i) ―clearly defined‖, (ii) narrow in scope and reach,
and (iii) can be justified on a sound policy rationale.23
The word ―certain‖ means ―known and particularized, but not
explicitly identified; determined, fixed, not variable: definitive,
precise, exact‖. The term ―certain‖ means that under the first
condition an exception or limitation in national legislation must be
clearly defined.
This guarantees a sufficient degree of legal
24
certainty.
To satisfy the first condition more is required than that the
exception or limitation be clearly defined. It must be also a ―special‖
case. It must accordingly be narrow in its scope and reach.25 In the
WTO Decision, a case which addressed whether S.110(5) of the
United States Copyright Act complied with S.13 of the TRIPS
Agreement, the WTO Panel defined the meaning of the word
―special‖ as follows:
We also have to give full effect to the ordinary meaning of
the second word of the first condition. The term ―special‖
connotes ―having an individual or limited application or
purpose‖, ―containing details; precise, specific‖, ―exceptional
in quality or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary‖ or
―distinctive in some way‖. This term means that more is
needed than a clear definition in order to meet the standard
of the first condition. In addition, an exception or
limitation must be limited in its field of application or
exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception or
limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a
qualitative sense. This suggests a narrow scope as well as an
Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.55, 10.03; WIPO Guide to the Copyright and
Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO (2003) [―WIPO Guide‖], at CT-10.2 at
23

213.
24 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.108; Ricketson, supra note 10 at 764.
25 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.109; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.55,
10.03; WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2; Ricketson, supra note 10 at §13.11.
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exceptional or distinctive objective. To put this aspect of
the first condition into the context of the second condition
(―no conflict with a normal exploitation‖), an exception or
limitation should be the opposite of a non-special, i.e., a
normal case.26

There is debate whether the first step imposes a third, public
policy requirement. Although several authorities have suggested that
there is no such additional requirement,27 a number have concluded
that a special case must be supported by some sound, social and legalpolitical reason to justify its application. For example, the WIPO
Guide to the Berne Convention interprets the term ―special case‖ as
follows:
This means that the use covered must be specific – precisely
and narrowly determined – and that no broadly-determined
cases are acceptable; and also that, as regards its objective,
it must be ―special‖ in the sense that it must be justifiable by
some clear public policy considerations.28

Prof. Ficsor in the Law of Copyright and the Internet
expresses a similar opinion:
First, the use in question must be for a quite specific
purposes: a broad kind of exemption would not be justified.
Secondly, there must be something ―special‖ about this
purpose, ―special‖ here meaning that it is justified by some
clear reason of public policy or some other exceptional
circumstance.29

Jörg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski in their treatise The
WIPO Treaties agree that limitations and exceptions should be based
on a ―specific and sound policy objective‖. They state that ―policy
areas of concern or relevance to limitations and exceptions may be
public education, public security, freedom of expression, the needs of
disabled persons, or the like‖.30

WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.109.
WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.111-6.112; Ricketson, supra note 10 at
para. 13.11.
28 WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2.
29 Ficsor, supra note 10 at para. 5.55.
30 Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski. The WIPO treaties 1996 : the WIPO
26
27

Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty : commentary
and legal analysis. (London : Butterworths, 2002) at 124 [Reinbothe].

110

The interpretation of the term ―special case‖ was canvassed in
an opinion rendered by the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts
which addressed whether private copying from illegal sources such as
P2P networks would comply with the three-step test set out in the
Berne Convention. The Council held it would not. In reaching this
conclusion, the Council interpreted the term ―special case‖ as
requiring a sound public policy reason:
First ―step‖: exceptions and limitations may only cover
―special cases.‖ This condition is partly of a quantitative,
and partly of a quantitative, normative nature. It is of a
quantitative nature in the sense that exceptions and
limitations may only be applied in a narrower scope, and it
is of a qualitative, normative nature in the sense that there
is a need for some sound, social and legal-political reasons
to justify their application.31

Based on the foregoing, to determine whether the Proposal
complies with the first condition of the three-step test, it is necessary
to determine at a minimum whether the Proposal is ―clearly defined‖
and narrow in scope and reach, and, according to at least some
authorities, whether it can be justified by a sound public policy
purpose.32 The Proposal does not meet any of these conditions.
A. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT CERTAIN
As noted above, to be ―certain‖ an exception must be clearly
defined to provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty. The Proposal
does not meet this test. The Proposal states that it targets online
sharing of songs, including the sharing of music on P2P networks‖.33
It also states that it targets illegal downloading over mobile phone
networks.34 However, the Proposal defines Music File Sharing ―as the
sharing of a copy of a copyrighted musical work without motive of
financial gain.‖ This definition could include all copying of musical
works done without a profit motive. Examples given in the Proposal

Hungarian Decision, supra note 10 at 12-13.
See Noel, supra note 9 at 12 also adopting the more rigorous two-prong test in
interpreting the term ―special‖.
33 See paras. 3 and 4 of the Summary of Proposal.
34 See para. 1 Summary of Proposal.
31
32
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are sharing music over P2P networks, wireless networks, email, CD,
DVDs and hard drives.35 On this view, any copying from any source
and onto any media would be covered.36 It could also cover musical
ringtones. There are real questions as to what is the intended scope of
the exception. In any event, the Proposal does not comply with the
requirement that an exception be a ―certain‖ special case.
B. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT NARROW IN SCOPE AND REACH
More fundamentally, the proposed file sharing exception is
also not narrow in scope or reach. In examining the scope of the
proposed file sharing exception, it is appropriate to take into account,
among other factors, the potential users who could be excepted from
liability, the acts that would be excepted, and the impact of the
proposed exception on other substitutable sources of music.37 The
Proposal has the following scope:
It would permit music file sharing by every Canadian
citizen as long as it is without motive of financial gain.
It would permit sharing of both musical works and
sound recordings, since both rights subsist in music
that is reproduced electronically.
It would permit sharing illegally made (infringing)
copies of music.
The purpose of the sharing could be to obtain the only
copy of the music ever acquired by the downloader.
As such, the Proposal would permit not only copying
for secondary purposes, e.g., to obtain a second copy
for use on a different format, but to acquire the only
copy that individuals may ever acquire. It would thus
directly substitute (or replace) purchased copies.
The file sharing technologies used to share music
could be any file sharing service, including P2P
See Proposal at para. 5.
The Proposal is not even limited to digital copying, however. It could conceivably
also include the reproduction of musical scores, musical compositions, and copying of
sheet music.
37 WTO Decision, supra note12 at paras. 6.113, 6.127, 6.131-6.133, 6.148.
35
36
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services like the former Napster, Grokster, or Kazaa;
Web and BitTorrent sites like QuebecTorrent,
IsoHunt, and TorrentBox; and not-for-profit music
sharing sites.
The media onto which music could be copied would
be unlimited and would include computers, PDAs,
digital audio recording devices (DARs) including
iPods, cellphones, CDs, and DVDs.
The Proposal would permit unauthorized copying
onto all sorts of other hardware, such as hardware
equipped with memory chips, radio and television
sets, digital cameras, digital video units, car stereos,
automobile information systems, watches, kitchen
appliances and so forth.
The proposal would except from infringement both
downloads and streams. It would, accordingly, also
permit streaming through a variety of sites and
services including Graboid.com; linking sites, like
youtvpc.com,
www.addictivejunk.com
and
www.peekvid.com; and sites, like youtube.com, that
streams music and other files.
Copying of every type and genre of music would be
excepted from liability. This could even include music
embodied in other content, such as movies, games and
software.
As the above demonstrates, virtually every Canadian with a
mobile phone or an Internet connection, a personal computer, a CD
or DVD burner, an iPod or other DAR would fall under the exception.
Literally any imaginable copying would be included, unless it is done
with a motive of financial gain. The Proposal in effect is an unlimited
license to copy music. The Proposal, far from being a ―special case‖
that is narrow in scope and reach, would be the opposite. It would
become a normal case. The net result would be a near total levitation
of the copyright system, where exclusive rights would effectively
cease to exist with respect to digital copying.38 The proposed file

Brent Hugenholtz et al, ―The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment, Final
Report, Institute for Information Law‖, March 2003 at 41 [IViR Final Report].
38
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sharing exception would accordingly not meet the first condition of
being a certain ―special‖ case.39
That the Proposal would not comply with the first condition
of the three-step test is supported by authorities that have considered
this question.
Bob Rietjens recently considered whether an
alternative compensation system to permit P2P file sharing for noncommercial purposes would comply with the special case condition of
the three-step test. He concluded that ―P2P licences are not compliant
with the first step of the three-step test. A P2P licence does not
qualify as narrow in scope, both in regard to the number of potential
users and in regard to the types of works covered.‖40
Prof. Jane Ginsberg also concluded that a broad exception to
exclusive rights to permit digital copying over P2P networks cannot
be characterized as a specific case:
―Because more and more works are marketed directly to
end users, private copying should no longer be
characterized ‗certain special cases‘: it is becoming a leading
mode of exploitation.‖41

The Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts considered this
question in determining whether private copying from illegitimate
P2P sources could comply with the first condition of the three-step
test. The Council concluded that it could not, because it would make
digital copying the normal case, rather than a special case, and
because it could not be justified on sound public policy considerations:
If private copying were allowed also from illegal sources, it
would conflict with the criteria of ―special cases.‖ First, it
would transform the ―special case‖ foreseen for the
application of the right to remuneration into a general form
Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155 argues that blanket licenses in respect of downloads
can meet the ―special case‖ condition because ―downloads that are part of a specially
organized public reward mechanism are peculiar and limited, and in the ordinary
English usage of the expression, they are certainly a special case of infringement.‖
Eckersley‘s reliance on a ―public reward mechanism‖ is an irrelevant factor under the
first condition, as the existence of compensation is only relevant in considering the
third condition. His conclusion that a blanket download license would be ―peculiar
and limited‖ is hard to reconcile with its actual scope and reach.
40 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332.
41 Ginsberg et al, ―Private Copying in the Digital Environment‖, in Kabel et al,
Intellectual Property and Information Law (Kluwer Law International 1998) at 149151.
39
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of reproduction. Second – and this in itself would be
sufficient to exclude the applicability of any exception or
limitation – it would not correspond to the condition that
for the recognition of a ―special case,‖ a sound and wellfounded social, legal-political justification is needed. As
regards private copying from illegal sources mentioned by
the petitioner, there are two typical sources. The first one is
that a work is made public, distributed or communicated to
the public illegally, in particular by making it available to
the public through the Internet (as it has happened recently
in the case of the Hungarian film ―Üvegtigris 2‖ (―Glass
Tiger 2‖)), and the other one is that the technological
protection measure applied by the owner of rights is
circumvented and the work thus distributed or
communicated to the public serves as a source of private
copying. To permit free uses or to limit the exclusive right

of reproduction to a mere right to remuneration in such
cases not only would not correspond to the quantitative,
qualitative and legal-political criteria of ―special cases,‖ but
it would also be in clear conflict with the very raison d‘être,
objectives and fundamental nature of copyright. The
message delivered by it would be devastating: do not care
that you copy from an illegal source; do not worry that you
do so without the author‘s consent; copyright is an out-ofdate institution; on the Internet, everything is free; just
copy any work and use it in this beautiful new world of
complete freedom! In fact, the illegal web-sites do
―advertise‖ themselves exactly with this kind of
―revolutionary ideology.‖42

For the above reasons the Proposal fails the first step of the
three-step test.

Hungarian Decision at para. 36 (emphasis added). Alexander Peukert and Carine
Bernault contend that the non-commercial reproduction of musical works through
P2P networks would comply with the first condition of the three-step test. Their
views assume that the first condition only requires some clear public policy
consideration to support a P2P non-voluntary license. Peukert, supra note 8; Carine
Bernault et al, ―Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Literary and Artistic Property, A
Feasibility Study Regarding a System of Compensation for the Exchange of works via
Internet‖. June 2005. To the extent such condition exists, their views conflict with
the persuasive opinion of the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts set out above.
In any event, any exception must also be narrow in scope and reach. Their opinion
fails to take this part of the three-step test into account.
42
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V
SECOND STEP: THE PROPOSAL WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE NORMAL
EXPLOITATION CONDITION
The second condition of the three-step test requires that a
limitation or exception not conflict with ―a normal exploitation‖ of
the work or sound recording. The interpretation of this condition
involves the construction of two terms: ―exploitation‖ and ―normal‖.
The ordinary meaning of the term ―exploit‖ connotes ―making
use of‖ or ―utilizing for one‘s own ends‖. The term refers to an
activity by which copyright owners employ the exclusive rights
conferred on them to extract economic value from their rights.43
The term ―normal‖ reflects two connotations. The first is an
empirical standard of what is regular, usual, typical or ordinary in a
factual sense. The second reflects a somewhat more normative, if not
dynamic, approach that takes into account potential technological and
market developments.44 An exception or limitation to an exclusive
right will rise to the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work if excepted uses enter into economic competition with the
ways that the rights holders normally, or could potentially, extract
economic value from that right in the work. All forms of exploiting a
work which have, or are likely to acquire, considerable economic or
practical importance must be reserved to rights holders. Accordingly,
the phrase ―normal exploitation‖ includes those forms of exploitation
that currently generate significant or tangible revenues as well as
those forms of exploitation that, with a certain degree of likelihood
and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or practical
importance.45
The WIPO Guide summarizes the elements of the second
condition as follows:

WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.165; Ricketson at 768; WTO Patent
Decision, supra note 12 at para. 7.54.
44 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.166; Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.16;
WTO Patent Decision, supra note 12 at para. 7.54.
45 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.177-6.183; Ricketson, supra note 10 at
paras. 13.18-13.19; Ficsor, supra note 10 at 284-285; Gowers, at para. 34; Peukert,
supra note 8 at 33-34.
43
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Second step (which may only follow if the exception or
limitation has not ―failed‖ at the first step; that is, it is a
special case): an exception or limitation must not conflict
with a normal exploitation of works. This means that all
forms of exploiting a work (that is, extracting value of the
exclusive right of reproduction in the work through
exercising it) which ha[ve], or [are] likely to acquire
considerable economic or practical importance, must be
reserved to the owner of this right; and that exceptions or
limitations must not enter into economic competition with
the exercise of the right of reproduction by the rights
owner (in the sense that it must not undermine the market
for the work in any way whatsoever).46

The WTO Decision summarized the second condition as
follows:
We believe that an exception or limitation to an exclusive
right in domestic legislation rises to the level of a conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work (i.e., the copyright
or rather the whole bundle of exclusive rights conferred by
the ownership of the copyright), if uses, that in principle
are covered by that right but exempted under the exception
or limitation, enter into economic competition with the
ways that right holders normally extract economic value
from that right to the work (i.e., the copyright) and thereby
deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains. 47

There can be little doubt that the online music market is
increasingly replacing physical sales of music as the primary
marketplace for virtual sales. Internationally, the market is rapidly
migrating from physical to digital formats and the digital distribution
of music is expanding at a fast pace.48 According to Forrester half of
WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2 (emphasis added).
WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.183.
48 ―In-Stat, The Online Music Market: Downloaded Music Will Outpace Physical
Media Bought Online in 2007 (―Healthy growth in the online music market will
continue for the rest of the decade, with worldwide sales growing from $1.5 billion in
2005 to $10.7 million in 2010‖); In-Stat, Online Music and Video: New Distribution
Channels Emerge (―Online sales of digital music represented 6% of the worldwide
music market in 2006, up from 4% in 2005, the high-tech market research firm says.
By 2011, online sales will represent 26% of all music purchased worldwide.‖);
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Overview—Global Entertainment and Media
Outlook: 2007-2011 (New York: PWC, 2007) (―The composition of the market is
rapidly migrating from physical to digital formats… We expect digital distribution of
46
47
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all music sold in the United States will be digital in 2011 and sales of
digitally downloaded music will surpass physical compact disc sales in
2012.49 This growing online distribution market uses a plethora of
technologies to offer licensed file sharing including P2P systems and
services.50 Technologies like BitTorrent DNA have the potential to
effectively deliver licensed musical content to millions of potential
buyers of musical content.51 In Canada, music is also being purchased
over the Internet from legitimate distribution services. The market
for paid downloads is growing and there is a growing migration from
physical to digital formats.52

music to expand at a 26.8 percent compound annual rate, more than tripling to $23
billion in 2011 from $7 billion in 2006.‖); International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry, IFPI:07 Digital Music Report (London: IFPI, 2007) (―Digital
music sales are estimated to have almost doubled in value worldwide in 2006,
reaching an estimated trade value of around US$2 billion. Digital channels accounted
for an estimated ten per cent of music sales for the full year 2006, up from 5.5 per cent
in 2005.‖).
49 ―Music Downloads to Surpass CD Sales by 2012‖, Boston Business Journal, February
19, 2008 (―Digital music sales will grow at a compound annual gross rate of 23% over
the next 5 years, reaching $4.8 billion in revenue by 2012. In contrast, by 2012, CD
sales will be reduced to $3.8 billion.‖).
50 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Digital Broadband
Content: Music, Report DSTI/ICCPI/IE(2004)12/FINAL (Paris: OECD) at 78-79;
Michael Einhorn, ―Gorillas in our Midst: Search for King Kong in the Music Jungle‖,
(2008) 55 J. Copyr. Soc‘y, at 145.
51 See a description of the BitTorrent Entertainment Network launched by BitTorrent,
Inc. at www.bittorrent.com.
52 Private Copying III Decision (―PC III‖), at 13 (Copyright Board finding that music is
being purchased over the Internet from ―legitimate distribution services‖); Private
Copying 2005, 2006 and 2007 (May 11, 2007) (―PC IV‖), at paras. 60-61 (Copyright
Board finding that 6% of all private copies were lawfully purchased online); CSI
Online Decision, at paras. 2, 6 (Copyright Board concluded that, ―we are now in the
midst of experiencing the next radical change: the authorized download over the
Internet of digital files containing sound recordings of musical works.‖);
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Overview—Global Entertainment and Media
Outlook: 2007-2011 (New York: PWC, 2007) (―The composition of the market is
rapidly migrating from physical to digital formats. We expect digital distribution of
music to expand at a 26.8 percent compound annual rate, more than tripling to $23
billion in 2011 from $7 billion in 2006.‖); Tom Jurenka ―Internet Industry Overview,
a Report Prepared for Gowling Lefleur Henderson LLP in connection with SOCAN
Tariff 22‖ (November 2006) at 5 (―Music is one of the great e-commerce success
stories of the Internet. In 2005 Canadians ordered just over $7.9 billion worth of
goods and services over the Internet, 16.4% of which was music of all categories‖);
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Based on the foregoing, the Proposal does not meet the
―normal exploitation‖ condition. The proposed file sharing exception
would expropriate rights that hold considerable economic and
practical importance to rights holders, an importance which is likely
to continue to grow significantly. Further, the broad scope of the
proposed file sharing exception would undoubtedly result in music
sharing that would enter into economic competition with commercial
sales channels.
As described above, the ―normal exploitation‖ condition not
only includes current exploitation methods. It also includes those
modes of exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood and
plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or practical
importance. In this regard, digital rights management makes it
increasingly possible to control unauthorized copying of works and to
develop innovative new business models desired by consumers.53 The
Canadian Government has stated that it intends to enact legislation to
implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty (―WCT‖) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (―WPPT‖). A core objective of
these treaties (the ―WIPO Treaties‖) is to create a favourable legal
environment, including by protecting TPMs, to bolster the market for

―Music on the Internet: A Canadian Perspective‖, Aaron Research, November 2006
(describing the Canadian sites and services involved in online music distribution).
53 Gowers at para. 168 (―DRM‘s are a legitimate and acceptable tool used by rights
holders and are increasingly being used to support new business models.‖); IViR Final
Report, supra note 38 at 1 (―In the digital environment, technical protection measures
and digital rights management systems make it increasingly possible to control how
individuals use copyrighted works. Rights holders and media distributors are now in a
position to apply, and are increasingly using, such systems to identify content and
authors, set forth permissible uses, establish prices according to the market valuation
of a particular work, and grant licenses directly and automatically to individual users.
Unlike levies, electronic copyright management systems make it possible to
compensate right holders directly for the particular uses made of a work. Where such
individual rights management is available there would appear to remain no need, and
no justification, for mandatory levy systems.‖); PC III at 11, 62 (Copyright Board
finding that ―TPMs‖ and ―DRM systems‖ are increasingly being used by rights holders
―to control the distribution and use of, and access to, music and other content.‖ The
Board predicted that the ―more widespread TPMs and DRM systems become, the
more rightsholders are likely to make content available legitimately, and therefore,
the more consumers can be expected to have otherwise paid for private copying
rights.‖).
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distributing digital content to end users.54 The current, exploitation of
music over digital networks already has brought this form of
exploitation within the ―normal exploitation‖ condition. Potential
future uses of technological protection measures and digital rights
management information makes the Proposal‘s broad exception for
copying including copying over digital networks even more
untenable.55
It may be argued, as SAC tries to do, that an exception coupled
with a levy system may be justified based on the obstacles being
encountered by copyright owners in enforcing their rights in the
digital environment.56 Levy systems have, in fact, been established in
Canada and around the world as a means of compensating copyright
holders against de minimis, or technically infringing copying, that is
too expensive or complicated to prohibit.57 It does not follow,

See Copyright Reform Process: A Framework for Copyright Reform, at 4 (June
2001); Supporting Culture and Innovation (Oct. 2002); Interim Report on Copyright
Reform, at 2-5 (May 2004); Government Statement on Proposals for Copyright
Reform (Mar. 2005); CIPO: Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 2005); Counterfeiting
54

and Piracy are Theft: Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology, at para. 5 (June 2007).
55 Ficsor, supra note 10 at C10.34 (―While in the case of ‗traditional off-line and off-air
‗home taping‘, the exercise of such a right was impossible, on the interactive digital
network – on the basis of technological measures and rights management information
– it is very possible.‖); Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126 (―[L]evy systems have usually
been based on the reasoning that…the exclusive right of reproduction cannot be
enforced. This reasoning looses its strength in the digital environment, which may
well result in the exclusive right of reproduction to be enforceable, particularly with
respect to digital private copying.‖); Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155-157 (Arguing that
the ―normal exploitation‖ step cannot be met if DRMs can be used to prevent
widespread unauthorized sharing of files); Gregory Hagen et al ―Canadian Copyright
Reform: P2P Sharing, Making Available and the three-step Test‖ (2006) Ottawa Law
and Technology Journal, 3:2 (arguing against amendments to the Copyright Act to
implement the WIPO Treaties because such amendments would enable copyright
holders to control the use of their works thus preventing the establishment of a levy
system for copying in the digital environment because such a system would fail the
three-step test).
56 Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155-157. Eckersley argues that an exception could be
justified if technological protection measures cannot prevent widespread
unauthorized sharing of information goods.
57 Ginsburg, at 149-150 (―private copying could be understood as non-infringing
because it was de minimis…but too expensive and complicated to prohibit‖);
Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.33 (―private use would appear to be confined to
the making of single copies, and the basis for it a kind of de minimis argument‖).
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however, that exclusive rights should be effectively replaced by a
right to receive remuneration because of difficulties in enforcement.
Prof. Ficsor addresses this argument as follows:
The idea emerges, time and again, that, if the exclusive
rights cannot be exercised in the traditional, individual way,
they should be abolished or reduced to a mere right of
remuneration. It is not, however, justified to claim that, if a

right cannot be exercised in a way in which it has been
traditionally exercised, it should be eliminated or
considerably reduced. In such a situation, there is no
reason for drawing the conclusion that a non-voluntary
license system is needed. There is a much more appropriate
option, namely the collective administration of exclusive
rights.58

Further, the Proposal does not contemplate a limited or de
minimis exception and hence does not meet the ―special case‖ first
condition. In addition, even though there is substantial unauthorized
copying, there is still a substantial marketplace for sales of music on
CD formats and a growing legitimate online distribution market place.
These marketplaces would be effectively undermined by an exception
to permit unlimited file sharing of music. The difficulties in enforcing
rights in the digital environment is not, in these circumstances, a
sufficient basis to overcome the second condition of the three-step
test.
Bob Rietjens addresses and rejects the argument that the
inability of rights holders to enforce their rights against P2P file
sharing is a sufficient basis to grant a broad exception from
infringement:
The Panel [in the WTO Decision] took a much broader
scope regarding the normative test: ‗We believe that an
exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic
legislation rises to the level of a conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that . . . are covered by
that right but exempted . . . enter into economic
competition with the ways that right holders normally
extract economic value from that right to the work . . . .‘.
M. Ficsor Collective Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
(Geneva: WIPO, 1990) at 6, (emphasis added) quoted by Daniel Gervais, ―Collective
Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An International
Perspective‖ (2001).
58
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The proper question thus is: do the acts allowed under the
exception enter into competition with the ways that right
holders normally exploit the work? This broader test
entails that it is not merely the financial interest in the part
that is split off from the copyright owner‘s bundle of rights
that is relevant. One must assess whether the exempted
acts enter into competition with all the ways in which right
holders normally extract economic value from their
copyright. The ‗half a loaf of bread is better than none at

all‘ argument is, therefore, not compliant with the second
step of the three-step test. How does this relate to the P2P
licence? In short: the fact that the copyright industry
cannot enforce certain acts is not relevant as a levy system
would undermine the normal exploitation forms used by
the copyright industry.59

The argument made by SAC that the exception only applies to
non-commercial file sharing also does not enable the Proposal to pass
the ―normal exploitation‖ condition. It is neither likely nor plausible
to assert that a wholesale non-commercial exception for file sharing
would not significantly, and potentially mortally, impair the
marketplace for traditional CD sales as well as the online digital sales
of music. These sales and services would be expected to compete with
free file sharing. Consumers would believe that the $5 per month
payment gives them the entitlement to obtain music for free. In such
circumstances, it cannot reasonably be expected that consumers
would believe they should pay twice to acquire music. Bob Rietjens
agrees:
It should be considered whether the legalization of P2P
networks has an effect on the sales of CDs, as sales of CDs
are a normal form of exploitation. P2P has a negative effect
on sales of CDs as ‗freely‘ downloadable music seems to be a

close substitute for off-line commercially purchased music.
Thus, legalized P2P use conflicts with a normal exploitation
of the work, in the sense that it competes with current
forms of exploitation that generate revenue, ie the sale of
CDs.
A similar argument goes for legal music download sites.
These sites seem to boom at the moment. There are
currently around 150 legal music download websites on the

59

Rietjens, supra note 8 at 331 (emphasis added).
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Internet of which 100 are in Europe. iTunes, MyCokeMusic.com, PureTracks, Sony‘s Connect, Napster, etc. are
doing good business. At any European site there are at least
450,000 tracks available. Some four million Europeans have
already paid for online music, but there would hardly seem

to be an incentive to use these sites if you are already
entitled to download music anyway (and are already
indirectly paying for it) under a P2P licence. This view is
supported by the Panel‘s view that substitution effects
should be taken into account. With regard to the ‗business‘
exception, the Panel stated that it was relevant that
establishments might be induced to ‗switch from recorded
or live music, which is subject to the payment of a fee, to
music played on radio or television, which is free of charge‘.
Apparently, substitution effects are important for the
second step of the three-step test.60

Further, in determining whether the second condition has
been met, a possible conflict with a normal exploitation of a particular
exclusive right cannot be counterbalanced or justified by the mere
fact of absence of a conflict with another mode of exploiting the work
even if the other form of exploitation would generate income for
rights holders.61
Accordingly, reserving to rights holders the
commercial marketplace for the distribution of music including a
potential to offer ―value added‖ services like iTunes or PureTracks
does not remove the conflict of the proposed file sharing exception
with the normal exploitation condition.
The fact that rights holders would be compensated under the
Proposal by the $5 levy on Internet subscriptions cannot justify the
file sharing exception. A right to receive equitable remuneration is
not a factor that can be taken into account in considering whether an
exception or limitation would conflict with a normal exploitation of a
work. Equitable remuneration can only be considered in the third
step in determining whether an exception would cause unreasonable
prejudice.62
Several authors who have studied proposals for non-voluntary
licenses to permit non-commercial P2P file sharing have similarly
Rietjens, supra note 8 at 331 (emphasis added).
WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.172; Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 125.
62 Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126-127; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.58, 10.3310.34; Senftleben, supra note 22 at paras. 4.3.2, 4.3.3.
60
61
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concluded that such proposals would fail to comply with the second
condition of the three-step test. Bob Rietjens concluded that the
second step of the three-step test cannot be met by a levy system
designed to provide compensation for non-commercial licensed
copying over P2P networks:
The P2P licence does not survive the scrutiny of the second
condition of the three-step test. The acts exempted by a
P2P licence (ie file sharing) compete with the normal
exploitation of works by the copyright industry. 63

Christophe Geiger expressed the same opinion in considering
whether the three-step test could be met by the creation of nonvoluntary licenses to legalize P2P file sharing:
Yet it seems hard to reconcile such solutions with the
second step, even by adopting a restrictive conception of
the notion of ―normal exploitation.‖ Such a solution would
certainly encroach directly on the main market of online
exploitation of works and would therefore violate the threestep test.64

Alexander Peukert, in a comprehensive law review article on
the subject, concluded that legalized P2P file sharing schemes are
incompatible with even the most restrictive view of the second
condition:
Applying these definitions to the proposals raises severe
doubts regarding their compatibility with the three-step
test. The reason is that the uses covered by the proposed
non-voluntary license, i.e. copying and distributing content
online by way of up- and downloads or streaming are a
source of income today and will probably become even
more important in the future. Right holders increasingly
establish commercial platforms offering their content for
download or streaming. Assuming that a complete shift to
commercial online distribution by way of streaming is
plausible at least for music and perhaps motion
pictures…non-voluntary licenses covering non-commercial

Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332.
Christophe Geiger, ―The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright
Law to the Information Society, UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, January-March 2007,
at 8-9.
63
64
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file sharing can hardly be considered to be in line with the
second criterion of the three-step test.65

The conclusion that the Proposal would not comply with the
―normal exploitation‖ condition of the three-step test is supported by
leading authorities that have interpreted the three-step test. Martin
Senftleben concluded:
If a specific privilege, like the exemption of time-shifting,
does not pose substantial difficulties, a broad limitation
generally privileging strictly private use in the digital
environment certainly does… [I]t is inevitable to conclude
that the broad privileges serving strictly personal use which
are known from the analogue world are likely to conflict
with a normal exploitation of copyrighted material in the
digital environment. If the digital revolution really takes
place and more and more works are directly marketed to
end-users, this emerging ―leading mode of exploitation‖ will
be threatened by the general exemption of private copying.
That the privilege would then erode the economic core of a
wide variety of works can hardly be denied. It would
encroach upon a typical major source of income. 66

Prof. Ficsor expressed the same opinion after canvassing
statements made by prominent copyright experts at a WIPO
worldwide symposium dealing with issues of the impact of digital
technology on copyright and related rights:
As these views clearly indicate, private copying through the
global information network is emerging as a major form of
utilization of works. Accepting the idea that every user of
the network should have the privilege to make a
reproduction freely for private, personal purposes –
considering the breathtaking growth of the Internet
population – would mean accepting that normal
exploitation of works would become impossible, and not
only on the global network but, as a consequence of free
availability of perfect copies, also in major ‗off-line‘
markets. Such a practice which so obviously conflicts with
basic forms of normal exploitation of works should not be
allowed under Article 9 of the Berne Convention (and
equally not under the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT
which incorporates this provision by reference). And since
65
66

Peukert, supra note 8 at 34 (emphasis added).
Senftleben, supra note 22 at 204, 206.
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we are faced here with serious conflicts with normal
exploitation and not only with ‗simple‘ prejudice to the
owners of rights, it is not sufficient to handle the problem
through the recognition of a mere right to remuneration,
with all the inadequacies of such remuneration systems and
with all the doubts about their compatibility with
international norms concerning the right of reproduction
and national treatment.67

The Hungarian Decision also specifically addressed whether
an exception to permit copying from unauthorized sources made
available through P2P networks would comply with the normal
exploitation step of the three-step test. After concluding that such an
exception, even if enacted as part of a levy scheme, would not comply
with the first step, the Council expressed the opinion that it would
also fail the second step:
In the case of the second ―step,‖ this does not require too
much effort, since on the basis of the findings outlined
above concerning the first ―step,‖ the answer seems obvious.
The ―on-line‖ making available of works in digital form,
along with copy-protection technological measures, for
private copying (downloading) has become a form of
normal exploitation. In view of this, the permission of this
kind of private from illegal sources would be in clear
conflict with this form of normal exploitation of the works
concerned.68

Based on the foregoing, the Proposal would also fail the
second step of the three-step test.
VI
THIRD STEP: THE PROPOSAL WOULD UNREASONABLY PREJUDICE THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF RIGHTS HOLDERS
Given that the Proposal would not pass either the first or
second steps of the three-step test, it is unnecessary to consider
whether the third step would be met. Given the very serious impacts

67
68

Ficsor, supra 10 at para. C 10.34.
Hungarian Decision at para. 37.
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of the Proposal on right holders, however, even the third step of the
three step test could not be met.
The analysis of the third condition of the three-step test
requires two determinations.
First, one must determine the
―legitimate interests‖ of right holders at stake. Then, it is necessary to
determine whether a prejudice reaches an ―unreasonable‖ level.69
The word ―legitimate‖ is commonly defined as (a)
conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle: lawful;
justifiable; proper; (b) normal, regular, conformable to a recognized
standard type.70 The term ―interests‖ may encompass a legal right or
title to a property or to the use or benefit of a property including
intellectual property. It may also refer to a concern about a potential
detriment or advantage, and more generally to something that is of
some importance to a person. The notion of ―interest‖ is thus not
necessarily limited to actual or potential economic advantage or
detriment.71
The term ―legitimate interest‖ relates to lawfulness from a
legal positivist perspective. However, it also has the connotation of
legitimacy from a more normative perspective that calls for the
protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives
that underlie the protection of exclusive rights. The interests to be
protected are those that are justifiable in the sense that they are
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.72
A limitation or exception will ―unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests‖ of the rights holder if it unreasonably deprives
the copyright owner of the right to enjoy and exercise the right of
reproduction as fully as possible, or where it causes or could cause an
unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner.73 Remuneration
paid under a compulsory licensing scheme can be considered in
determining whether an exception causes unreasonable prejudice.

WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.222.
WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.224; WTO Patent Decision supra note 12at
para. 7.68.
71 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.223.
72 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.224; WTO Patent Decision, supra note 12
at paras. 7.68-7.73; Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras. 13.23-13.25.
73 Ficsor Copyright, at paras. 5.57, 10.03; WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.2206.229.
69
70
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But remuneration will avoid unreasonable prejudice only in justifiable
cases. 74
The third step allows a balancing between the interests of
rights holders and legitimate societal interests.75 The words ―not
unreasonably prejudice‖ allows the making of exceptions that may
cause prejudice of a significant or substantial kind to the authors‘
legitimate interests, provided that the exception otherwise satisfies the
first and second conditions of the three-step test, and as long as it is
proportionate or within the limits of reason; it must not be
unreasonable.76 In determining what prejudice the author should
reasonably be required to tolerate, both the quantity and quality of
the potential prejudice must be assessed.77 Prof. Ricketson explains
this with an example of the possibility of creating exceptions to
address, respectively, the activities of individual photocopying, home
taping, and file sharing:
[C]ompare the activities of individual photocopying, with
individual home taping, and individual file sharing. The
first might well pass all three steps, although maybe not
from a cumulative point of view; the second looked at
cumulatively, might pass step 2 but not step 3, leading
inevitable to some kind of compulsory license. The third
should not pass step 2, because of its open-ended character,
and would not therefore arise for consideration under the
third step. In this regard, national legislators should not fall
into the trap of assuming that any unreasonable prejudice
that might otherwise result to authors can always be
assuaged through the imposition of a compulsory license: by
definition, there will always be some ―prejudices‖ that
cannot be remedied in this way. While Article 9(2) is far
from providing a ―bright line‖ rule that can be readily
applied, the individual and cumulative effect of each of the
three steps, in particular the third, is to highlight the need
for care, moderation, and constraint in constructing any
compulsory licensing scheme under national law.78
Senftleben, supra note 22 at para. 4.3.2.
Gowers at para. 34.
76 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.27; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.58, 10.3310.34; J. Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126-127; Senftleben, supra note 22 at paras. 4.3.2,
4.3.3.
77 Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 127.
78 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.27.
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The Hungarian Decision also considered whether an
exception to permit file sharing from unauthorized sources could be
justified under the third step of the three-step test. The Council of
Copyright Experts expressed the opinion that it could not. Their
view, with which we agree, is that such an exception would be
neither ―legitimate‖ nor ―reasonable‖:
As pointed out above, in the case of the third ―step,‖ the
words ―legitimate‖ and ―unreasonably‖ have a normative,
value-oriented meaning, and that, in judging whether a
prejudice to the legitimate interests of authors is reasonable
or unreasonable, also the possible legitimate interests of
third parties and of the public at large should be taken into
account. The panel believes that there is no need to
elaborate on the reasons for which it would be nonsense to

claim that, in addition to free private copying from legal
sources, the permission of such copying from illegal sources
could also be recognized as a legitimate interest of users,
and that the prejudice caused by this to the owners of rights
would not be unreasonable. The right to remuneration
alone would not be suitable to reduce the prejudice thus
caused to a reasonable level.

The Proposal would fail the third condition of the three-step
test, because it would, essentially, create an expropriation of copyright
holders‘ rights to exploit music. Exclusive rights in music would
effectively cease to exist and rights holders would become almost
totally dependent on the equitable remuneration levy. The exception
would likely compromise the credibility of the copyright system as
many users would probably consider themselves legitimately free to
use and abuse copyrighted works in any manner they see fit. The net
result of the Proposal would be a near total ―levitation‖ of the
copyright system.79 The proposed file sharing exception would
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of rights holders.

IViR Report, supra note 38 at 41 (commenting on the implications of applying
levies to multi-purpose digital machines such as PCs).
79
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VII
THE PROPOSAL‘S INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE ROME CONVENTION
Canada could also not implement the Proposal without
violating Canada‘s international obligations under the Rome
Convention. Under that convention producers of phonograms must
be given the right ―to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect
reproduction of their phonograms.‖80
Under the convention
contracting states can provide for exceptions or limitations for: (a)
private use; (b) use of short excerpts in connection with the reporting
of current events; (c) ephemeral fixation by a broadcasting
organisation by means of its own facilities and for its own broadcasts;
and (d) use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research.81
None of the above exceptions or limitations would be broad
enough to permit the Proposal to be implemented into law. The
exception for ―private use‖ is limited to a use that is neither public or
for profit.82 It is principally relevant to copying of phonograms in the
privacy of the recipient‘s home.83 Exceptions for private use are
generally confined to the making of single copies by users.84 Private
use does not, however, extend to acts of commercial scale
reproduction including acts of making copies for the purposes of
distribution to others, or making copies by means of P2P file share
services.85 ―The Rome Convention thus limits the definition of
―private‖ copying in a way similar to the private copying exception in
the Canada Copyright Act; a copy made for the personal use of the
maker, and not for the purpose of distribution, or for the purpose of
Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 10. The term ―phonogram‖ is defined to
mean ―any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or of other sounds‖.
The term ―reproduction‖ is broadly defined to mean ―the making of a copy or copies
of a fixation‖. Ibid. Article 3.
81 Ibid. At Article 15(1).
82 WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention , (WIPO
1981), Commentary 15.2 to Article 15 to the Rome Convention. The WIPO Guide
expressly notes, ―As to phonogram producers, the ease with which recording of high
quality can be made these days places the idea of private use in a new dimension.‖
Ibid.
83 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.12
84 Ibid. at para. 13.33 (―private use would appear to be confined to the making of
single copies‖).
85 Ibid. at para. 19.12.
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trade or for communication to the public by telecommunication. The
peer-to-peer ―sharing‖ that is at the essence of the SAC Proposal is not
permitted under the Rome Convention.‖86
SAC itself acknowledges that its Proposal goes further than an
exception for private copying. The Proposal makes this clear in the
following statement:
The new right would make it legal to share music between
two or more parties, whether over Peer to Peer networks,
wireless networks, email, CD, DVD, hard drives etc.
Distinct from private copying, this new right would
authorize the sharing of music with other individuals.87

Article 15(2) of the convention also permits exceptions or
limitations in the following situations:
Irrespective of paragraph 1 of this Article, any Contracting
State may, in its domestic laws and regulations, provide for
the same kinds of limitations with regard to the protection
of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting
organisations, as it provides for, in its domestic laws and
regulations, in connection with the protection of copyright
in literary and artistic works. However, compulsory
licences may be provided for only to the extent to which
they are compatible with this Convention.

This paragraph permits exceptions or limitations where they
fall within the boundaries provided by domestic laws with respect to
the protection of copyright in works. It allows for the same type of
exceptions or limitations that are provided to works to apply to
phonograms. 88 It is also an indirect reference to the three-step test in
the Berne Convention as the basis of exceptions and limitations in
domestic copyright laws must, as a matter of that convention,
conform to that test.89 Since the Proposal cannot be implemented with
respect to musical works without violating the three-step test under
the Berne Convention, Canada would be equally unable to enact

86

Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Ss. 80(1); 80(2).

Proposal at para. 5. (emphasis added)
WIPO Guide at RC-15.3; Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms
Convention (WIPO 1981) at para. 15-7-15.9.
89 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.16.
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legislation to implement the Proposal with respect to sound
recordings under the Rome Convention.90
Moreover, under Article 15(2) compulsory licences can only
be enacted to the extent they are compatible with the convention.
The Rome Convention allows for compulsory licenses only in limited
circumstances, none of which would apply to permit the
expropriation of producers‘ reproduction rights in sound recordings in
exchange for a mere right of remuneration as contemplated by the
Proposal.91
The failure of the Proposal to comply with the provisions of
the Rome Convention provides a further basis for concluding that it
would violate the TRIPS Agreement. Under Article 14.2 of TRIPS,
producers of phonograms must enjoy the right to authorize or
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms.
Article 14.6 of TRIPS permits exceptions or limitations to this right
only to the extent permitted by the Rome Convention. Accordingly,
since the Proposal could not be implemented without violating the
Rome Convention, it could not be implemented into law without also
abrogating Canada‘s obligations under TRIPS.
VIII
THE PROPOSAL COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT ABROGATING
OR AMENDING THE BERNE CONVENTION, TRIPS, NAFTA AND THE

ROME CONVENTION
For the reasons given above, the Proposal could not be
implemented by Canada without violating Canada‘s international
obligations under the Berne Convention, Rome Convention the
TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA, unless each of those international
instruments were amended to make the Proposal possible. Indeed,
many of the proponents of such schemes have expressly
As detailed above, Canada would also be unable to enact the Proposal with respect
to sound recordings because under NAFTA exceptions and limitations to the
reproduction right in sound recordings must comply with the three-step test and the
Proposal would not comply with that test.
91 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.16 (pointing out that compulsory licenses are
allowed under Art. 7(2)(2) (broadcasting of performances), Art. 12 (broadcasting of
phonograms), and Art. 13(d) (communication to the public of certain broadcasts)).
90
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acknowledged that their proposals could not be implemented without
changes to international agreements related to copyright. Prof.
Fisher, for example, notes that the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement would need to be modified before his alternate
compensation proposal could be implemented.92 Prof. Lessig expressly
acknowledges that some of his proposals ―would require changes to or
the abrogation of some treaties‖, identifying in particular the Berne
Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Treaties as those
that would need to be changed or breached.93 Other individuals who
have studied the compliance of non-voluntary licenses with the threestep test concur. These proposals, like the Proposal, do not meet the
internationally accepted test for exceptions and limitations to
exclusive rights. 94
Fisher at 247-248. Prof. Fisher expressed the view that there could be some
discretion with respect to recordings of musical compositions pursuant to Article 13
of the Berne Convention. However, Article 13(1) only permits the imposition of
reservations and conditions ―to authorize the sound recording‖ of a musical work.
This provision addresses the fixation of a musical work onto a sound recording, which
was likely intended to encompass the recording of a musical work by instruments
capable of reproducing them mechanically. See WIPO Guide at BC-13.1 (explaining
the history of the provision). Article 13 does not permit exceptions for otherwise
reproducing musical works. Nor would it allow any exceptions to Canada‘s
obligations to provide rights holders with the exclusive right of authorizing
reproductions of sound recordings under NAFTA.
93 Lessig, supra note 7 at 330-331. Canada has not yet ratified the WIPO Treaties.
Accordingly, this article does not address the Proposal‘s compliance with those
treaties.
94 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332 (―The interpretation by the Panel [in the WTO
Decision] of the TRIPS three-step test indicates that only those exclusions that allow
de minimus use are allowed, regardless of lack of effective or affordable means of
enforcement or social or cultural policy reasons. P2P licensing is a clear breach of
countries‘ obligations under the TRIPS three-step test. In the EU/USA WTO dispute,
the USA decided not to amend its copyright laws. Instead it decided to pay a yearly
damage (‗buy out‘) to the EU. In contrast, it is clear that countries can not buy their
way out of a P2P licence as the amount of damages would simply be too high. P2P
licensing might be academically challenging, but it seems of little practical
importance, as P2P licensing is not compliant with the TRIPS three-step test.‖);
Geiger at 8 (―Such a solution would certainly encroach directly on the main market of
on-line exploitation of works and would therefore violate the three-step test.‖);
Peukert, supra note 8 at 78-79 (―This paper has shown, however, that none of the
currently discussed models is in accordance with obligations contained in
international copyright law. The BC, TRIPS and WCT rest upon the notion of legal
and technological exclusivity enjoyed by the copyright owner. They are opposed to
the implementation of statutory, non-voluntary licenses covering non-commercial
92
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Prof. Litman, recognizing that a non-voluntary license regime
would not comply with United States treaty obligations, proposed an
opt-out mechanism, which would allow rights holders to choose not
to participate in the scheme (the SAC proposal contains no such optout mechanism). However, it is clear that she also doubts whether
her proposal for a statutory default rule, even with an opt-out
procedure, would comply with United States treaty obligations. She
states that such a process would ―be deemed at least arguably
compliant‖ with United States‘ treaty obligations under the Berne
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. However, she notes
that her ―proposal‘s Berne-compatibility is optional‖ and she also
apparently doubted whether an opt-out proposal would comply with
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which prohibits imposing any
formalities on the enjoinment or exercise of rights.95
The doubts expressed by Prof. Litman as to whether a nonvoluntary alternate compensation system could be established based
on an opt-out mechanism are well founded. Under Article 5(2) of the
Berne Convention, the enjoinment and the exercise of the rights to be
provided ―shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoinment and
such exercise shall be independent of the existence of the protection
in the country of origin of work‖. ―Formalities‖ are any conditions or
measures, independent from those related to the creation of a work,
without the fulfilment of which the work is not protected or loses
protection. Registration, deposit of the original or a copy, and the
indication of a notice are typical examples.96 An opt-out model would
be a condition or measure affecting the enjoinment and the exercise of
rights holders‘ exclusive rights. Alexander Peukert, after considering

file sharing. Only if the right holder is free to decide whether she wants her work to
be subject to a levy/tax system is exclusivity as the fundamental requirement of
international copyright law accomplished. What is more, exclusive rights and
individual licensing have to be the legal default. Therefore, only an opt-in model
according to which the right holder has to register the work for the levy/tax system
can be implemented in national law without the need to amend international
copyright treaties or terminate membership.‖). See also OECD Report at 92 (―New
compulsory licenses for P2P could also be found to interfere with obligations under
the major international agreements dealing with copyright such as the Berne
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.‖); Ficsor, supra note 10 at para. C10.3310.34.
95 Litman, supra note 7 at 43-44 and footnotes 166-167.
96 WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at § BC-5.7.
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the opt-out models suggested by Profs. Litman and Prof. Fisher, came
to the same conclusion:
To sum up, the opt-out model as suggested by Jessica
Litman and William Fisher is a state-required formality for
the enjoyment of minimum exclusive rights. It is thus not in
line with Art. 5(2) [of the Berne Convention]. The reason is
again that international copyright law persists in the notion
of exclusive rights, even in the digital network
environment. These exclusive rights have to come into
existence without further formalities as the statutory
default. To provide for exclusivity only under the condition
that the right holder opts out of a levy/tax system does not
meet this requirement.97

IX
CONCLUSION
The SAC Proposal for the monetization of file sharing of
music in Canada would, in return for a right of equitable
remuneration, effectively legalize the copying and distribution of
music over online networks and onto any other conceivable media
and devices. The Proposal would, if implemented effectively, result in
unlicensed file sharing becoming the norm in Canada. The Proposal
would usurp markets currently being exploited by copyright owners,
Peukert, supra note 8 at 65. See also Daniel Gervais, ―Towards a New Core
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test‖ bepress Legal Series,
paper 214, (March 2004) at 71-73. (―Because the Berne Convention, the substantive
obligations of which were incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement, severely limits the
availability of compulsory licensing, at least for the rights of composers, any licensing
system should thus be voluntary. I believe this is also in line with traditional
copyright policy: if a rights holder does not want his work licensed, then he should
have that right‖). Prof. Gervais has expressed the opinion that an opt-out mechanism
could be implemented as part of an extended collective licensing regime. An
extended collective license is not a non-voluntary license or a remuneration regime
for private copying. Daniel Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing
Regime in Canada: Principles and Issues Related to Implementation, study prepared
for the Department of Canadian Heritage, June 2003 at 17, 26-27. (Prof. Gervais also
noted in discussing extended collective licensing that a compulsory license with no
opt-out rights can only exist ―where international conventions allow the
implementation of a compulsory license, as is the case with cable retransmission‖.
97

Ibid.
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including markets that are growing in size and importance. The
proposed music file sharing exception would, in effect, create a
competitive marketplace in which rights holders would be expected
to compete for business with free music sharing by individuals
through the use of P2P and other file sharing systems. The overall
effect would be the expropriation, or near expropriation, of copyrights
in musical works and sound recordings. Copyright holders‘ only
realistic form of compensation would be the proposed levy system.
For the reasons given above, the Proposal would not comply
with any of the three conditions in the three-step test. Accordingly,
it could not be implemented without abrogating Canada‘s
international obligations related to copyright or without amendments
to the Berne Convention, Rome Convention, the TRIPS and NAFTA.
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